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Abstract
Seven studies tested the hypothesis that people use subjective time progression in hedonic evaluation. When people believe that 
time has passed unexpectedly quickly, they rate tasks as more engaging, noises as less irritating, and songs as more enjoyable. 
We propose that felt time distortion operates as a metacognitive cue that people implicitly attribute to their enjoyment of an 
experience (i.e., time flew, so the experience must have been fun). Consistent with this attribution account, the effects of felt 
time distortion on enjoyment ratings were moderated by the need for attribution, the strength of the “time flies” naive theory, 
and the presence of an alternative attribution. These findings suggest a previously unexplored process through which subjective 
time progression can influence the hedonic evaluation of experiences.
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Research Article
Time perception is an integral part of psychological experi-
ence. However, because the duration of most meaningful 
experiences outlasts the capacity of working memory, people 
often have difficulty estimating how long experiences lasted. 
For example, in one elaborate demonstration, speleologist 
Michel Siffre spent 2 months isolated in a cave, away from the 
natural and mechanical clocks outside. Upon emerging after 
59 days, he underestimated his endeavor’s duration by a 
staggering 25 days (Siffre, 1964). Subsequent empirical inves-
tigations suggest that duration estimates are influenced by 
many factors, including attentional engagement (Chaston & 
Kingstone, 2004), arousal (Campbell & Bryant, 2007; Gruber 
& Block, 2003; Kellaris & Mantel, 1996; Loftus, Schooler, 
Boone, & Kline, 1987; Stetson, Fiesta, & Eagleman, 2007), 
and motivation (Conti, 2001; Sarason & Stroops, 1978; Vohs 
& Schmeichel, 2003). Thus, subjective duration often diverges 
from objective duration. When this occurs, time feels dis-
torted: When time passes surprisingly quickly, it feels like 
time flew by; when time passes surprisingly slowly, it feels 
like time dragged on.1
The feeling of time distortion may prompt people to seek 
an explanation. A ready answer may come from overgeneral-
ization of the common naive theory that “time flies when 
you’re having fun.” Given that attentional demands shorten 
duration estimates (Block & Zakay, 1997; Chaston & Kingstone, 
2004) and that highly enjoyable activities can monopolize 
attention (e.g., Csikszentmihalyi, 1975, 1990), this intuitive 
link between subjective time progression and hedonic experi-
ence does not seem terribly misinformed.2 When people are 
faced with otherwise inexplicable time distortions, however, 
overgeneralization of this presumed relationship may lead to 
inappropriate causal inferences. Thus, we predict that the 
sense that time “flew” will enhance people’s evaluations of 
experiences, whereas the sense that time “dragged” will worsen 
evaluations. 
Numerous experiential cues have been shown to influence 
evaluative judgments by prompting attributions (e.g., Schwarz 
et al., 1991; Stepper & Strack, 1993, Whittlesea, 1993). Typi-
cally, such cues involve a cognitive experience (e.g., violation 
of expectations) that leads to a process of sense making rely-
ing on theories about thinking, or metacognition. The imperfect 
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nature of duration estimation suggests that time distortion may 
be a common experience that prompts sense making, and peo-
ple’s naive theories may provide a metacognitive attribution for 
this experience. In the studies reported here, we tested whether 
naive theories connecting enjoyment and time progression lead 
people to infer enjoyment of experiences from surprising time 
distortions. We first tested whether people evaluate experiences 
more favorably when they think time passed more quickly 
(Studies 1a, 1b, and 2). We then examined whether this effect 
occurs because people attribute time distortions to the hedonic 
value of the experience. We tested this hypothesized process by 
manipulating the surprising nature of time progression (Study 
3), by measuring (Study 4a) and manipulating (Study 4b) 
beliefs in the connection between time progression and enjoy-
ment, and by providing participants with an alternative 
attribution for time distortions (Study 5).
Studies 1a and 1b: When Time 
Flies, Tasks Are More Fun
In our first test, we manipulated external time cues while par-
ticipants completed a mundane task. By manipulating actual 
or alleged task duration, we created the illusion of fast or slow 
time progression. For example, if someone engages in a task 
for 5 (or 20) min but is told that 10 min have passed, that 
person should be surprised by time’s progression—that is, he 
or she should feel that time flew (or dragged) by. There are two 
ways to execute this temporal discrepancy: (a) manipulating 
actual duration while holding alleged duration constant and 
(b) holding actual duration constant while manipulating alleged 
duration. Study 1a used the former strategy, whereas Study 1b 
used the latter. In both studies, we expected that participants 
would evaluate the task more positively when time seemed 
to pass surprisingly quickly than when time seemed to pass 
surprisingly slowly.
Method
In Study 1a, university students (N = 37; 23 males, 14 females) 
were paid for participating in a study ostensibly examining 
cognitive processing. Each participant completed the study 
individually. In each session, the participant was asked to set 
aside all possible distractions, including watches and mobile 
phones, thus leaving no external time cues. The experimenter 
then provided selections of text and instructed the participant to 
quickly and accurately underline all words containing double-
letter combinations (e.g., the word epigrammatic has double 
ms). The participant was told that the task would last exactly 10 
min. Upon instructing the participant to begin, the experimenter 
conspicuously started a stopwatch and exited the room. 
Outside the room, the experimenter exchanged her stop-
watch for an identical one preset to approximately 10 min. In 
the time-flies condition, she reentered the room after only 5 
min had passed. In the time-drags condition, she reentered 
after 20 min had passed. Upon reentering the room, however, 
Table 1. Effects of the Time Manipulation on Felt Time Progression 
(Manipulation Check) and Enjoyment Ratings in Studies 1a and 1b
 Time condition
Rating Time flies Time drags
Felt time progression  
 Study 1a 6.16 (1.21) 1.83 (0.71)
 Study 1b 5.72 (1.12) 2.88 (1.20)
Enjoyment  
 Study 1a 3.75 (1.29) 2.72 (1.38)
 Study 1b 3.30 (1.20) 2.61 (0.87)
Note: Standard deviations are given in parentheses. Within each row, the 
means are significantly different from each other, ts > 2.35, ps < .025.
the experimenter announced that 10 min had passed and casu-
ally set the stopwatch reading 10 min next to the participant 
while proceeding with instructions. The participant then used 
7-point scales to rate the task in terms of enjoyment, challenge, 
engagement, fun, skill required, and how excited he or she 
would be to participate in a similar task in the future. As a 
manipulation check, the participant also indicated how time 
seemed to progress, using a 7-point scale (1 = time dragged, 4 = 
pretty normal, 7 = time flew).
The procedure of Study 1b was identical to that of Study 1a, 
except that all participants (N = 79; 34 males, 45 females) 
spent the same amount of time (10 min) on the task. In the 
time-flies condition, the alleged task duration was 20 min; in 
the time-drags condition, it was 5 min.
Results
The results of Studies 1a and 1b are summarized in Table 1. 
The manipulation was successful: Participants in the time-flies 
conditions reported faster time progression than did partici-
pants in the time-drags conditions, t(35) = 13.14 in Study 1a 
and t(77) = 10.86 in Study 1b, ps < .001, preps > .99. Ratings of 
enjoyment, challenge, engagement, fun, skill required, and 
excitement to reengage were highly related (α1a = .89, α1b = 
.83) and were thus combined to create a composite measure of 
enjoyment. As hypothesized, participants in the time-flies con-
ditions rated the task as more enjoyable than did participants in 
the time-drags conditions—Study 1a: t(35) = 2.36, p = .024, 
prep = .92, d = 0.80; Study 1b: t(77) = 2.95, p = .006, prep = .97, 
d = 0.67. Thus, the experience of time distortion affected eval-
uations of the task regardless of whether that experience was 
induced by manipulating the actual (Study 1a) or alleged 
(Study 1b) passage of time.
Study 2: When Time Flies, Noises 
Are Less Irritating
Studies 1a and 1b suggest that experiences seem more enjoy-
able when time is felt to have progressed surprisingly quickly 
and less enjoyable when time is felt to have progressed sur-
prisingly slowly. In Study 2, we sought to test the robustness 
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of these findings in three ways. First, whereas the word task 
used in Studies 1a and 1b was of relatively neutral valence, we 
wanted to examine whether time distortions also influence 
evaluations of tasks that have strong (in this case, negative) 
hedonic value.3 Second, the active participation required by 
the word task may have induced flow (i.e., complete immer-
sion in an active task—Csikszentmihalyi, 1975, 1990), which 
is associated with both increased enjoyment and reduced 
awareness of time. Study 2 tested whether evaluations of a 
passively experienced task, which is unlikely to induce flow, 
can be similarly influenced by time distortions. Third, in Study 
2, we manipulated subjective time progression in the presence 
of external time cues; the presence of such features better sim-
ulates those naturalistic settings in which clocks and timers are 
ubiquitous, but these features also might mitigate the influence 
of subjective time distortions.
Method
Ninety-nine undergraduates (44 males, 55 females) partici-
pated in fulfillment of a course requirement. Participants sat at 
a computer, donned headphones, and listened to a 30-s clip of 
synchronized dot-matrix printers, taken from a track titled 
“} . } @ }. @ . } @ } . @ . } @ } . @ . } @ } . @ . } @ } . @ . }” 
([The User], 2002). The track was described as “printing 
sounds” and was generally considered to be irritating. While 
participants listened to the clip, a timer counting each second of 
elapsed time was presented on the screen. To manipulate sub-
jective time progression, we either accelerated (time flies) or 
decelerated (time drags) the timer by 20%. Participants then 
rated their experience on a 9-point scale with endpoints labeled 
not unpleasant at all and very unpleasant, and rated their irrita-
tion with the sounds on an 11-point scale with endpoints labeled 
OK noise and terrible noise. Additionally, participants listened 
to a 5-s sound clip of an electric drill and then indicated their 
preference for listening to the printing sounds again versus lis-
tening to the drill instead; ratings were made on a 201-point 
slider scale ranging from –100 (definitely would prefer the 
printing noise) to +100 (definitely would prefer the drill sound). 
Results
Because unpleasantness and irritation ratings were highly 
related (α = .92), these two measures were standardized and 
combined into a single composite variable (with larger values 
indicating more negative ratings). Results were consistent with 
those of Studies 1a and 1b; participants in the time-flies condi-
tion (M = –0.39) rated their listening experience less negatively 
than did participants in the time-drags condition (M = 0.53), 
F(1, 97) = 5.67, p = .019, prep = .95, ηp
2 = .06. Furthermore, 
participants were less willing to switch from printing sounds to 
a different irritating noise (electric-drill sounds) if they were in 
the time-flies condition (M = –25.6) than if they were in the 
time-drags condition (M = 11.9), F(1, 97) = 6.17,
p = .015, prep = .96, ηp
2 = .06. These results again indicate that 
people evaluate an experience more positively if time seems to 
pass surprisingly quickly rather than surprisingly slowly—even 
when the experience is clearly unpleasant, there is no active par-
ticipation, and there is continuous temporal feedback. 
Study 3: When Time Flies, Good 
Songs Get Better 
We have argued that the accelerated passage of time leads to 
feelings of time distortion, which are then attributed to greater 
subjective enjoyment. However, Studies 1a, 1b, and 2 left open 
the possibility that subjective time progression influences 
enjoyment directly (e.g., fast subjective time progression might 
be inherently pleasant). The remaining studies tested our pro-
posed attribution explanation by manipulating the need for 
attribution (Study 3), by measuring and manipulating the 
strength of participants’ naive theory connecting time progres-
sion and enjoyment (Studies 4a and 4b), and by manipulating 
the presence of an alternative attribution (Study 5). 
People typically seek explanations for subjective experi-
ences only when the experiences diverge surprisingly from 
expectations (Whittlesea & Williams, 2000). Study 3 used a 
procedure similar to that of Study 2 but manipulated the sur-
prising nature of the time progression by varying whether the 
timer counted up (elapsed time) or down (remaining time). If 
subjective time progression influences enjoyment of an expe-
rience directly, then any felt acceleration or deceleration of 
time should influence participants’ ratings of the experience. 
In contrast, if a sense-making process is involved, then effects 
on enjoyment ratings should be observed only when time’s 
progress is surprising. When the timer counted up, the alleged 
duration was unknown at the beginning and became apparent 
only as the experience concluded, resulting in surprise at the 
discrepancy between alleged and expected elapsed time. When 
the timer counted down, however, participants learned the 
(alleged) duration before the experience began. By the time 
the endpoint (0:00) arrived, it was unsurprising and therefore 
required no sense making.
Additionally, Study 3 involved a clearly pleasant hedonic 
experience. This allowed us to test whether fast time progres-
sion can not only make less-than-pleasant experiences seem 
more tolerable, but can also make pleasant experiences seem 
more enjoyable. It is possible that pleasant experiences are 
less enjoyable (and more stressful) when time flies, because 
people would prefer positive experiences to be extended rather 
than abbreviated. However, if people use subjective time pro-
gression to infer enjoyment, then the experience of time flying 
should enhance both unpleasant and pleasant experiences, and 
the experience of time dragging should worsen both unpleas-
ant and pleasant experiences.
Method
University students (N = 106; 72 males, 34 females) were paid 
to participate in a study in which they chose their favorite song 
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from 12 popular selections (e.g., “Crazy” by Gnarls Barkley) 
and evaluated that song using a 201-point slider scale (–100 = 
I really hate it, +100 = I really love it). After completing an 
unrelated filler study, participants listened to their chosen 
song. The song timer was displayed on the computer screen; it 
was either accelerated or decelerated by 20% and displayed 
either elapsed time or remaining time. Participants then 
reported their enjoyment on a 9-point scale with endpoints did 
not enjoy it at all and enjoyed it tremendously and rated the 
song on an 11-point scale with endpoints terrible song and 
fantastic song.
Results
To control for prior song liking, we used initial song rating as 
a covariate in all analyses. Postlistening enjoyment ratings and 
song evaluations were highly related (α = .94) and were stan-
dardized and combined into a single composite. There were no 
main effects of timer speed or direction on this composite 
measure, Fs < 1, ps > .30. However, as expected, timer speed 
and direction showed a reliable interaction, F(1, 173) = 4.50,
p = .035, prep = .93, ηp
2 = .03. When the timer displayed elapsed 
time, participants reported enjoying the song more in the time-
flies condition (M = 0.54) than in the time-drags condition
(M = –0.44), F(1, 173) = 4.21, p = .042, prep = .92, ηp
2 = .05. 
This effect was eliminated when the timer displayed the 
remaining time (Ms = –0.22 and 0.13), F < 1, p > .30. Thus, 
when the timer displayed elapsed time, even a pleasant experi-
ence seemed more enjoyable when time passed surprisingly 
quickly (vs. surprisingly slowly). However, consistent with an 
attributional account, this effect disappeared when the timer 
displayed remaining time—and thus removed the experience 
of surprise. 
Studies 4a and 4b: Measuring and 
Manipulating Naive Theories
We have proposed that to make sense of surprising time distor-
tion, people implicitly rely on a belief that time passes more 
quickly during more enjoyable experiences. If this is true, then 
the effects of time distortion should depend on the strength of 
this belief. In the next two studies, we measured (Study 4a) 
and manipulated (Study 4b) participants’ belief in the naive 
theory that “time flies when you’re having fun.” The more 
strongly people endorse this naive theory, the more likely they 
should be to attribute surprising time progression to 
enjoyment.
Study 4a
Method. Students from two universities (N = 109) were paid 
for participating in either a paper-based (n = 43) or a
computer-based (n = 66) study. All participants were told that 
they would be evaluating anagram puzzles for future research. 
Participants first indicated their general liking of anagrams on 
an 11-point scale (–5 = dislike very much, +5 = like very much). 
Next, they were presented with a list of 45 five-letter anagrams 
and asked to solve as many as possible in 10 min (time flies) or 
in 5 min (time drags). They then worked on the anagram task 
for exactly 7.5 min, after which they were told that 10 or 5 min 
had passed, either by the program (in the computer-based ver-
sion) or by the experimenter showing them a preset stopwatch 
(in the paper-based version). Next, participants indicated their 
enjoyment of the anagram task on a 7-point scale (1 = did not 
enjoy it at all, 7 = enjoyed it a great deal). After answering 
some filler questions, participants indicated their belief that 
“time flies when you’re having fun” by using a 7-point scale to 
rate the extent to which the saying holds in real life (1 = it 
never holds, 7 = it always holds). The study concluded with a 
funnel debriefing procedure that probed for suspicion regard-
ing the time manipulation. 
Results. All analyses used participants’ prior self-reported 
liking of anagrams as a covariate. The computer-based and 
paper-based groups did not differ in their reported enjoyment 
of the task, nor did this factor interact with the time effect (Fs < 
1, ps > .30). We therefore present analyses of the pooled data. 
Once again, participants in the time-flies condition (M = 4.62) 
reported enjoying the experience more than did participants in 
the time-drags condition (M = 4.10), F(1, 106) = 8.58, p = .004, 
prep = .97, ηp
2 = .07. Moreover, the effect of the time manipula-
tion was significantly more pronounced among participants 
with a stronger belief that “time flies when you’re having fun,” 
β = 0.33, t(103) = 2.57, p = .012, prep = .95, ηp2 = .06. 
We also examined debriefing responses to assess whether 
participants were indeed unaware of the inaccuracy of the 
timing instructions. Of the 109 participants, 5 suspected a 
timing inaccuracy after this possibility was suggested to them. 
Removing these participants from the analyses did not change 
any of the conclusions.
Study 4b
Method. Sixty-four university students (31 males, 33 females) 
were recruited for a paid study in which they would be asked to 
recall details from news articles. To manipulate participants’ 
belief in the “time flies” naive theory, we presented them with a 
fabricated article reporting scientific evidence that either sup-
ported this belief or refuted it. All participants also read an 
additional (real) article (Ansari, 2008) unrelated to our hypoth-
esis. They then completed the word task described in Study 1a, 
which was ostensibly a filler task before the recall portion of the 
study. The time manipulation and task rating procedures were 
identical to those of Study 1a. After rating the task, participants 
were asked to rate how convincing each article was, using a 
7-point scale (1 = not at all convincing, 7 = extremely convinc-
ing). The study concluded with a funnel debriefing interview.
Results. There was no main effect of article condition on task 
enjoyment ratings (composite α = .83), F < 1, p > .30, and 
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participants rated the two articles about the experience of time 
as similarly convincing, F(1, 59) = 2.28, p = .14. Participants 
reported enjoying the task more in the time-flies condition 
than in the time-drags condition, F(1, 60) = 21.51, p < .001, 
prep > .99, but more important, this effect was moderated by the 
manipulation of belief in the naive theory, F(1, 60) = 5.94, p = 
.018, prep = .95, ηp
2 = .09 (see Fig. 1). Participants who read the 
article confirming their naive theory reported enjoying the 
word task more in the time-flies condition (M = 3.73) than in 
the time-drags condition (M = 1.95), t(33) = 5.16, p < .001, 
prep > .99, d = 1.75. No such effect was observed among par-
ticipants who read the refuting article (Mflies = 2.89, Mdrags = 
2.34), t(27) = 1.52, p = .14, d = 0.57.
In the funnel debriefing, 10 participants voiced some suspi-
cion of timing inaccuracies after this possibility was suggested 
to them. Removing these participants from the analyses did 
not change any of the conclusions.
Study 5: Providing Alternative Attributions 
for Time Distortion
We have argued that people attribute surprising time distor-
tions to their enjoyment of the experience, using their naive 
theory about the relationship between time progression and 
enjoyment. If this is the case, then the effect of time distortion 
on hedonic evaluations should occur only in the absence of a 
reasonable alternative explanation for the distortion (see 
Schwarz, 2004). Study 5 tested this hypothesis by providing 
some participants with an alternative attribution for their expe-
rienced time distortion.
Method
As in Study 1a, university students (N = 60; 23 males, 37 
females) spent either 5 or 20 min on a task identified as taking 
exactly 10 min. The design of Study 5 differed from that of 
Study 1a in three ways. First, all participants wore foam ear-
plugs as part of a cover story about reducing external 
distractions. Second, at the beginning of the task evaluation 
questionnaire, half of the participants were presented with a 
mock survey question designed to suggest that wearing ear-
plugs may make time seem to fly (or drag, depending on time 
condition). The remaining half of the participants did not see 
this questionnaire item. Third, at the end of the task evaluation 
questionnaire, all participants were asked to indicate whether 
they would like to participate in a future study involving a 
60-min version of the same word judgment task.
Results
Participants reported that time progressed faster in the 
time-flies condition (M = 6.25) than in the time-drags condi-
tion (M = 2.47), F(1, 56) = 119.35, p < .001, prep > .99. 
The explanation manipulation did not influence this measure, 
Fs < 1, ps > .30.
Participants reported greater enjoyment (composite α = 
.81) if time flew than if time dragged, F(1, 56) = 12.11, p < 
.001, prep = .99, ηp
2 = .18, but this effect was moderated by the 
presence of an alternative attribution, F(1, 56) = 4.10, p = .048, 
prep = .88, ηp
2 = .07 (see Fig. 2). In the absence of an alternative 
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attribution, participants reported greater task enjoyment in the 
time-flies condition (M = 4.71) than in the time-drags condi-
tion (M = 2.81), t(30) = 3.94, p < .001, prep > .99, d = 1.44, but 
when participants were provided with the alternative, earplugs 
explanation, this effect was eliminated (Mflies = 3.57, Mdrags = 
3.36), t(26) = 1.02, p = .32. Furthermore, participants in the 
no-explanation condition were more likely to volunteer for a 
future study involving the task if they were in the time-flies 
condition (93%) than if they were in the time-drags condition 
(61%), χ2(1, N = 32) = 4.23, p = .040, prep = .93, whereas vol-
unteer rates in the earplugs-explanation condition were not 
significantly influenced by the time manipulation (Ms = 79% 
and 71%), χ2(1, N = 28) = 0.19, p = .66.
General Discussion
Subjective time progression influences hedonic evaluation. 
Feelings of time distortion can cue inferences of enjoyment, 
but only when subjective time progression is surprising (Study 
3), when one holds the belief that enjoyment accelerates time 
progression (Studies 4a and 4b), and when no alternative attri-
butions are available (Study 5). We suggest that subjective 
time progression serves as input into a metacognitive judg-
ment mechanism and thus plays a role similar to that of other 
metacognitive experiences, such as fluency and accessibility 
(for reviews, see Sanna & Schwarz, 2007; Schwarz & Clore, 
2007; Schwarz, Sanna, Skurnik, & Yoon, 2007). Furthermore, 
the present findings extend previous research suggesting that 
people often neglect the duration of events when judging 
hedonic value (e.g., Redelmeier & Kahneman, 1996; but see 
Ariely & Loewenstein, 2000). Consistent with speculation that 
people might overcome duration neglect when they become 
attentive to time (Fredrickson & Kahneman, 1993), our data 
suggest that although people might neglect true duration when 
making hedonic judgments, surprising discrepancies between 
expected and actual durations significantly influence hedonic 
evaluations.
Notably, however, because our studies compared acceler-
ated time with decelerated time, it is impossible to distinguish 
positive effects of accelerated time progression from negative 
effects of decelerated time progression. We therefore conducted 
an additional investigation (N = 59) comparing song ratings 
obtained under an accelerated timer with those obtained under 
a regular timer, using the elapsed-time condition from Study 3. 
As predicted, participants in the time-flies condition reported 
enjoying the song more (M = 0.46) than did those in the regu-
lar-time condition (M = –0.31), F(1, 56) = 7.67, p = .008, prep > 
.99, ηp
2 = .14. This result suggests that experiences can be 
improved simply by accelerating subjective time progression.
Taken together, these findings have important implications 
for understanding and changing hedonic experience. As recent 
work suggests, there is value in increasing subjective enjoy-
ment without changing core features of the task at hand (see 
Hsee, Hastie, & Chen, 2008). Extraneous variables that sys-
tematically shorten duration estimates, such as physiological 
arousal (e.g., Gruber & Block, 2003) or inattention to temporal 
cues (e.g., Curton & Lordahl, 1974), might influence people’s 
hedonic judgments in ways previously not understood. The 
current research thus provides insight into new ways to 
improve people’s subjective enjoyment of a wide range of 
experiences, particularly negative experiences (e.g., waiting) 
that are virtually inevitable in day-to-day life.
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Notes
1. Duration estimates may be inaccurate for numerous reasons (see, 
e.g., Jones & Boltz, 1989; Zakay & Block, 1997). However, the stud-
ies we report in this article focused on the hedonic consequences of 
experiencing time distortion, independent of what caused the time 
distortion itself.
2. We define “subjective time progression” as the relative pace at 
which time seems to have passed from the perceiver’s standpoint.
3. We later used a positive hedonic experience (Study 3).
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